Rabbi Judah stated in the name of Rav: "Adam was not permitted meat for purposes of eating as it is written, 'for you shall it be for food and to all beasts of the earth' (Genesis 1:29), but not beasts of the earth for you. But when the sons of Noah came, [God] permitted them [the beasts of the earth] as it is said, 'as the green grass have I given to you everything' (Genesis 9:3)."

Some writers have regarded this statement as reflecting the notion that primeval man was denied the flesh of animals because of his enhanced moral status. Permission to eat the flesh of animals was granted only to Noah because, subsequent to Adam's sin, his banishment from the Garden of Eden and the degeneration of subsequent generations, man could no longer be held to such lofty moral standards. Nevertheless, they argue, man ought to aspire to the highest levels of moral conduct and, consistent with such a value system, man should eschew the flesh of animals.

In point of fact, this talmudic dictum is simply a terse statement of the relevant law prior to the time of Noah but is silent with regard to any validating rationale. While the statement in question may well be compatible with a vegetarian ideal, it may quite readily be comprehended as reflecting entirely different considerations. Indeed, the classic biblical commentators found entirely different explanations for the change which occurred with regard to dietary regulations. Thus, for example, Rabbi Jacob ben Asher, renowned as the author of the Tur Shulhan Arukh, in his commentary on Genesis 1:29, explains that prior to partaking of the fruit of the Tree of Knowledge, Adam lacked any desire for meat; only subsequent to eating of the forbidden fruit did man acquire a carnivorous nature. Hence the dispensation granted to Noah to eat the flesh of animals simply reflects man's transformed biological needs.

Rabbi Meir Leibush Malbim, in his commentary on Genesis 9:3, remarks that Adam was endowed with a "strong" constitution and that the produce available in the Garden of Eden was nutritionally optimal in nature. Under such circumstances, Adam's dietary needs could be satisfied without recourse to meat. Only as mankind degenerated physically as well as spiritually, became geographically dispersed and hence subject to the vagaries of climate, and as the quality of available produce became nutritionally inferior, did it become necessary for man in his "weakened" state to supplement his diet with animal products in order to assure the availability of the nutrients required for his biological needs.

An examination of the writings of rabbinic scholars reveals three distinct attitudes with regard to vegetarianism:

I. The Talmud (Pesachim 49b) declares that an ignoramus ought not partake of meat: "'This is the law of the animal... and the fowl' (Leviticus 11:46): whoever engages in [the study of] the Law is permitted to eat the flesh of animals and fowl, but whoever does not engage in [the study of] the Law may not eat the flesh of animals and fowl." This text should certainly not be construed as declaring that meat is permitted only to the scholar as a reward for his erudition or diligence. (1)

The 15th century commentator, Maharsha, indicates that this text reflects a concern for scrupulous observance of the minutiae of the dietary code. The ignoramus is not proficient in the myriad rules and regulations governing the eating of meat, including the differentiation between kosher and non-kosher species, the porging of forbidden fat and veins, the soaking and salting of meat, etc. Only the scholar who has mastered those rules and regulations can eat meat with a clear conscience.

Indeed, an earlier authority, Rabbenu Nissim, citing Rabbi Sherira Ga'on, explains that an ignoramus is advised to refrain from eating meat because he is ignorant of the proper method of performing ritual slaughter and of examining the internal organs. A similar interpretation is advanced by Rabbi Moses Isserles (Teshuvot Rema, no. 65) who remarks that the ignoramus is not proficient in the laws of ritual slaughter. Maharsha notes that this stricture applies only to eating the flesh of land animals, but places no restriction upon the eating of fish, even though reference to fish is also made in the very same biblical verse. The reason for this distinction is that the dietary code pertaining to consumption of fish is relatively simple and can be mastered by everyone, while preparation of animal meat is governed by complex regulations requiring diligent study.

Historically, there certainly have been individuals who, depending upon circumstances of time and place, did deny themselves meat -- not because of the ethical implications of a carnivorous diet, but because of their concern for inadvertent transgression of provisions of the dietary code. For example, during the early part of the twentieth century, many pious immigrants to the United States declined to eat meat because of the lax standards of kashrut supervision then prevalent in this country. Such individuals adopted vegetarianism as a lifestyle, but did so because of concern for observance of the technicalities of religious law rather than because of moral considerations.

A number of medieval scholars regard vegetarianism as a moral ideal, not because of a concern for the welfare of animals, but because of the fact that the slaughter of animals might cause the individual who performs such acts to develop negative character traits, viz., meanness and cruelty. Therefore, their concern was with regard to possible harmful effects upon human character rather than with animal welfare. (2)

Indeed, Rabbi Joseph Albo maintains that renunciation of the consumption of meat for reasons of concern for animal welfare is not only morally erroneous but even repugnant. Albo asserts that this was the intellectual error committed by Cain, and that it was this error that was the root cause of Cain's act of fratricide. Scripture reports that Cain brought a sacrifice of the produce of the land while Abel offered a sacrifice from the animals of his flock.

Albo opines that Cain did not offer an animal sacrifice because he regarded men and animals as equals (3) and, accordingly, felt that he had no right to take the life of an animal, even as an act of divine worship. Abel maintained that man was superior to animals in that he possessed reason, as demonstrated in his ability to use his intellect in cultivating fields and in shepherding flocks. This, Abel believed, gave man limited rights over animals, including the right to use animals in the service of God, but did not confer upon him the right to kill animals for his own needs.

Albo further explains God's acceptance of Abel's sacrifice and His rejection of that of Cain as being directly related to their respective views regarding the relative moral status of men and animals. Cain's error was egregious in the extreme. Hence, he was so lacking in favor in the eyes of God that his sacrifice was rejected. Although he was also guilty of error, Abel's sacrifice was accepted by God because his error was not as serious as that of his brother. According to Albo, Cain failed to understand the reason for the rejection of his sacrifice and continued to assume that his own value system was correct, but that, in the eyes of God, animal sacrifice was intrinsically superior to the offering of produce. Since Cain remained confirmed in his opinion that man and animals are inherently equal, he was led to the even more grievous conclusion that just as man is entitled to take the life of an animal, so also is he entitled to take the life of his fellow man.

This position, Albo asserts, was adopted by succeeding generations as well, and it was precisely the notion that men and animals are equal that led, not to the renunciation of causing harm to animals and to concern for their welfare, but rather, to the notion that violence against one's fellow man was equally acceptable. The inevitable result was a total breakdown of the social order which ultimately culminated in punishment by means of the flood. Subsequent to the flood, meat was permitted to Noah, Albo asserts, in order to impress upon mankind the superiority of man over members of the animal kingdom.

Albo does not explain why the generations after the flood drew the correct conclusion and were not prone again to commit the error of Cain. Rather than recognizing the inherent superiority of man that is reflected in the dispensation granted them to partake of the flesh of animals, they might have concluded that violence against man is similarly justified because men and animals are coequal. It was precisely this conclusion that Cain drew from God's acceptance of animal sacrifice. It may, however, be possible that, at that juncture of human history, the possibility of drawing such a conclusion was effectively obviated.

The Torah declares (Genesis 7:23) that during the period of the flood, God destroyed not only man but also every living creature. The Talmud (Sanhedrin 108a) queries, "If man sinned, what was the sin of the animals? Rabbi Joshua the son of Korchah answered the question with a parable: A man made a nuptial canopy for his son and prepared elaborate foods for the wedding feast. In the interim his son died. The father arose and took apart the nuptial canopy declaring, 'I did nothing other than on behalf of my son. Now that he has died, for what purpose do I need the nuptial canopy?' Similarly, the Holy One, blessed be He, said, 'I did not create animals and beasts other than for man. Now that man has sinned, for what purpose do I need animals and beasts?"'

Those comments serve to indicate that the extermination of innocent animals in the course of the Deluge must be regarded as positive proof of the superiority of man over members of the animal kingdom. Animals could be destroyed by a righteous God only because the sole purpose of those creatures was to serve man. Hence, if man is to be destroyed, the continued existence of animal species is purposeless. Thus, the basic principle, i.e., the superiority of man over members of the animal kingdom, was amply demonstrated by the destruction of animals during the course of the flood. No further demonstration of the relative status of man and beasts was necessary. Permission to eat the flesh of animals was then required only as a means of explicitly negating the residual notion that animals are somehow endowed with rights, and that man's obligations vis-a-vis animals are rooted in such rights, rather than in a concern for the possible moral degeneration of man himself... (4)

One modern-day scholar who is often cited as looking upon vegetarianism with extreme favor is the late Rabbi Abraham Isaac Kook. It is indeed the case that in his writings, Rabbi Kook speaks of vegetarianism as an ideal, and points to the fact that Adam did not partake of the flesh of animals. In context, however, Rabbi Kook makes those comments in his portrayal of the eschatological (messianic) era. (5) He regards man's moral state in that period as being akin to that of Adam before his sin and does indeed view renunciation of enjoyment of animal flesh as part of the heightened moral awareness which will be manifest at that time. (6)

But Rabbi Kook is emphatic, nay, vehement, in admonishing, that vegetarianism dare not be adopted as a norm of human conduct prior to the advent of the eschatological era. Rabbi Kook advances what are, in effect, four distinct arguments in renunciation of vegetarianism as a goal toward which contemporary man ought to aspire:

(A) Addressing himself to members of the vegetarian movement, Rabbi Kook remarks almost facetiously that one might surmise that all problems of human welfare have been resolved and the sole remaining area of concern is animal welfare. In effect, his argument is that there ought to be a proper ordering of priorities. Rabbi Kook is quite explicit in stating that enmity between nations and racial discrimination should be of greater moral concern to mankind than the well-being of animals and that only when such matters have been rectified should attention be turned to questions of animal welfare. (7)

(B) Given the present nature of the human condition, maintains Rabbi Kook, it is impossible for man to sublimate his desire for meat. The inevitable result of promoting vegetarianism as a normative standard of human conduct, argues Rabbi Kook, will be that man will violate this norm in seeking self-gratification. Once taking the life of animals is regarded as being equal in abhorrence to taking the life of man, it will transpire, contends Rabbi Kook, that in his pursuit of meat, man will regard cannibalism as no more heinous than the consumption of the flesh of animals. (8) The result will be, not enhanced respect for the life of animals, but rather debasement of human life.(9)

(C) Man was granted dominion over animals, including the right to take their lives for man's own benefit, in order to impress upon him his spiritual superiority and heightened moral obligations. Were man to accord animals the same rights he accords fellow human beings, he would rapidly degenerate to the level of animals in assuming that he is bound by standards of morality no different from those espoused by brute animals. (10)

(D) In an insightful psychological observation, Rabbi Kook remarks that even individuals who are morally degenerate seek to channel their natural moral instincts in some direction. Frequently, they seek to give expression to moral drives by becoming particularly scrupulous with regard to some specific aspect of moral behavior. With almost prescient knowledge of future events, Rabbi Kook argues that, were vegetarianism to become the norm, people might become quite callous with regard to human welfare and human life, and express their instinctive moral feelings in an exaggerated concern for animal welfare. (11)

Despite the foregoing, vegetarianism is not rejected by Judaism as a valid lifestyle for at least some individuals. There are, to be sure, individuals who are repulsed by the prospect of consuming the flesh of a living creature. It is not the case that an individual who declines to partake of meat is ipso facto guilty of a violation of the moral code. On the contrary, Scripture states, "and you will say: 'I will eat meat,' because your soul desires to eat meat; with all the desire of your soul may you eat meat" (Deuteronomy 12:20). The implication is that meat may be consumed when there is desire and appetite for it as food; but may be eschewed when there is no desire and, afortiori, when it is found to be repugnant. (12) The question is one of perspective. Concern arises only when such conduct is elevated to the level of a moral norm.

Ethicists who do not accept the notion of the revelation of the Torah by God are left with a problem with regard to the nature of ethical propositions. Ethical statements are clearly more than an expression of subjective likes or dislikes, since man has no difficulty in distinguishing between the expression of a mere preference and the expression of what he regards as a moral norm. C. L. Stevenson drew the distinction in essentially the following manner:

The statement "I like spinach" is a reflection of subjective feeling and nothing more. The proposition "X is good" resolves into two statements, viz., "I approve of X. You do so as well." The proposition "X is good" goes beyond the proposition "I like spinach" in that it is addressed to others and seeks to have them adopt the attitude of the speaker. (13)

An individual's subjective repugnance at the prospect of consuming the flesh of an animal is an aesthetic response rather than a moral reaction. It becomes a moral position only when expressed in advocating the adoption of such norms of conduct by others as well. Jewish tradition does not command carnivorous behavior; it rejects the notion that, at least during the current historical epoch, renunciation of the eating of meat should be posited as a moral ideal for mankind. Thus, although "moral vegetarianism" finds no support in Jewish ethics, "aesthetic vegetarianism" is not incompatible with Jewish teaching. (14)

FOOTNOTES:

1. This text has also been understood homiletically as underscoring the lesson that man was created to study Torah and that, should he fail to do so, he remains in a spiritual state analogous to that of lower animals. Since such a person has not developed his unique spiritual potential as a human being, he should not regard himself as endowed with superiority vis-a-vis members of the animal kingdom. See Rabbi Isaac Arama, Akeidat Yizhak, Parshat Bashalah, sha'ar 41, and Rabbi Moses Feinstein, Iggerot Moshe, Hoshen Mishpat, II, no. 47, sec. 1. Cf., Maharal of Prague, Netivot Olam, chap. 15. Shevet Mussar, chap. 36, adduces this text in support of his contention that only the pious are superior to animals and hence only the pious are entitled to partake of the flesh of animals.

2. Rabbi Issac Abarbanel in his commentary on Genesis 9:3 and Isaiah 11:7, and Rabbi Joseph Albo, Sefer ha-Ikkarim, Book III, chapter 15. See also Rabbi Abraham I. Kook, Iggerot Re'iyah (Jerusalem, 5722), II, 230.

3. In contemporary times, some advocates of animal rights have adopted precisely this position in arguing that all sentient creatures have equal moral standing. According to this view, there is no moral difference between a man and a dog, hence the pain suffered by dogs must be weighed no differently from the pain suffered by humans. A presentation of the moral equality of species is that of Peter Singer, Animal Liberation (New York, 1977).

4. See Rabbi Ben-Zion Firrer, Panim Chadashot ba-Torah (Jerusalem, 5735), I, 45.

5. It should be noted that Rabbi Kook espouses the kabbalistic view that in the eschatological era, the so-called lower animals will be endowed with intelligence similar to that of man in the present era. See Rabbi Abraham I. Kook, "Afikim ba-Negev," Ha-Peles, vol. 3, no. 12 (Elul 5663), p. 718.

6. Yet it must be noted that it is in that Messianic era that the Talmud (Baba Batra 75a) declares that God will prepare a feast for the righteous consisting of the flesh of the Leviathan. Similarly, the Midrash (Vayikra Rabbah 13:3) speaks of a meal consisting of the meat of animals to be served to those who presently observe the kosher dietary laws (i.e., the restrictions concerning carrion and forms of prohibited meat).

7. See Ha-Peles, vol. 3, no. 11 (Ab 5663), p. 658, excerpted in "Hazon haZimhonut ve-ha-Shalom," Mishnat ha-Rav, ed. Abraham Rieger and Yochanan Fried (Jerusalem, 5721), pp. 211-12.

8. A recent writer presents a strikingly similar argument in decrying attempts to ban animal experimentation. He argues that prohibiting the use of live animals in biomedical research may well result in replacement of animal subjects with humans. See Carl Cohen, "The Case for the Use of Animals in Biomedical Research," The New England Journal of Medicine, vol. 315, no. 14 (October 2 1986), p. 868.

9. See Ha-Peles, p 658; Mishnat ha-Rav, p. 212.

10. See Ha-Peles, p. 659; Mishnat ha-Rav, pp. 214-16.

11. See Ha-Peles, p 659-60; Mishnat ha-Rav, p. 217. A related, but different, concept is the Freudian notion of reaction formation, i.e., when faced with an unacceptable impulse, the ego may try to sidetrack the offensive impulse by transforming its conscious representation into its opposite. Thus an unconscious aggressive or destructive instinct may be masked and hidden from awareness by manifestations of excessive felicity. In terms of this theory, the concern with regard to the development of character traits based upon reaction formation is that a breakthrough of the original impulse is a continuous danger. See Sigmund Freud, "Notes upon a Case of Obsessional Neurosis," trans. by A. Strachey and J. Strachey, The Standard Edition of The Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, ed. J. Strachey, X (London, 1955), 249; idem, "Psychoanalytic Notes upon an Autobiographical Account of a Case of Paranoia (Dementia Paranoides)." trans. by A. Strachey and J. Strachey. The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, XII (London, 1958), 3-82; and idem, "Inhibition, Symptoms and Anxiety," trans. by A. Strachey and J. Strachey, The Standard Edition of the Complete Works of Sigmund Freud, XX (London, 1959), 75-174.

12. See Ha-Peles, p. 657; Mishnat ha-Rav, p. 209.

13. See Charles L. Stevenson, Ethics and Language (New Haven, 1944), pp. 20-26.

14. By the same token, adoption of a vegetarian lifestyle because of a sincere conviction that consumption of meat is deleterious to health is not incompatible with Jewish teaching. See also Sedei Hemed, Asifat Dinim, ma'arekhet akhilah. sec. 1.